Systemic Evil: The Penn State Scandal

                                        Happy Valley

Senior Research Paper/ Zachary Irey/ Kettering University

 

Joe Paterno was the king of Penn State, practically deified. Some would argue that JoPa, as he was called, had more power than the president of the university himself. I argue that “Joe Paterno and the others with the power to ‘do more’ when they were told of Sandusky’s alleged crimes had acted ten years ago, some of those alleged victims looking for peace would never have become alleged victims” (Littlefield). Their main disagreement is the choice to not go to the police. In an interview Louis Freeh of the Freeh report said that Paterno “was an integral part of this active decision to conceal”. School leaders, “empowered Sandusky to attract potential victims to the campus and football events by allowing him to have continued, unrestricted and unsupervised access. [And] provided Sandusky with the very currency that enabled him to attract his victims." (CITE) Their argument would not make sense had Paterno been a simple passerby but someone employed by the university so nearly half a century. Similarly, their argument is very similar to that which Adolf Eichmann brought up in his trial of 1961. Eichmann was accused of playing a key role in the egregious crimes against the Jewish race during WWII. Eichmann argued that he was “following orders” (CITE). The outcome of the trial was not good for Eichmann. The judges saw through his lies and convicted him on all counts. But did Joe just follow his orders? Yes he did. But when you are someone who architected the corporate structure that surrounds you, it’s your duty and responsibility to see thru the corporate corruption.

First of all, I will explain the writing of John Darley contained in his article entitled “How Organizations Socialize Individuals into Evildoing”.  This article is primarily focused on corporate responsibility and the necessary elements required to create “socially negative corporate scenarios”(CITE). It also goes on to say “how individuals are heavily pressured by internal corporate culture, management structures and corporate agendas and can then go on to propagate the same.” (CITE) These individuals are not corrupt when they start at the company. Rather, they undergo a conversion and become autonomous participants in harmful actions (Darley, p.13). Thru this corruption the individuals become evil, yet they do not show the typical traits that today’s society would associate with evildoing. Darley proves his argument by asking himself a few questions. How are individuals drawn into doing harm? This is answered in four sections: Diffusion and fragmentation of information and responsibility, commitment to courses of action, abstract harm and tangible gains, and employee self-interest and job survival. The first section, diffusion and fragmentation of information and responsibility, is a very rudimentary concept. Knowledge of wrongdoing can be diffused throughout a large company and due to a lack of communication those making decisions cannot be held responsible if they did not have all of the information to making an informed decision. Secondly, commitment to courses of action, correlates to Staw’s theory of sunk costs. Once an initial investment or expenditure has been made, corporations are reluctant to withdraw from their course of action. Third, abstract harm and tangible gains, “lndividuals within the organization can lose sight of the fact that people may be harmed in the course of fulfilling the other goals of the corporation or bureaucracy.” (Darley, p. 23). A salient human is not deemed to be in harm’s way and therefore their action is justifiable. Lastly, employee self-interest and job survival, an employee’s own beliefs will be set aside to correlate with those of the company. If a worker is told to do something, they often do not gauge whether it is ethical or not. Rather they autonomously do what they were told. Answering this question in four sections brings up another question. Now that we know how organizations corrupt individuals, what corporation can corrupt individuals?

The ethical dilemma up for discussion is that of Joe Paterno’s response to the information presented to him by Mike McQueary. Did he do enough? Well, looking at the situation from the perspective of John Darley, he did not. To understand Darley’s position, I will answer this question using the sectional format he defined. Firstly, diffusion and fragmentation of information and responsibility. All of the evidence that Paterno had was second hand. Personally, he didn’t witness a thing. He was aware of the charges at the Alamo bowl and knew what McQueary had told him, but he had a history with Sandusky. After all, Sandusky was at one point in time the defensive coordinator under Paterno, a very respected position in the football hierarchy. This history could not be wiped away by the words of a graduate assistant alone. Therefore, Paterno did not have enough information to make an informed decision and is not responsible for the outcome. Secondly, commitment to courses of action. Undoubtedly, the football program is central to Penn State’s identity, brand and public image. Penn State was committed to the football program. After all, it brought the university roughly $20 Million dollars a year in profit. A flaw found is this great empire would greatly reduce their profitability. So, with the idea of sunk costs, Penn State couldn’t make this public. Thirdly, abstract harm and tangible gains. As said previously, “lndividuals within the organization can lose sight of the fact that people may be harmed in the course of fulfilling the other goals of the corporation or bureaucracy.” Could this define what happened any more clearly? Paterno built an empire, aka corporation, that he couldn’t let be harmed by a few people. Although these people were children, he was blind to the cause but rather omniscient of the result. A result that would have “abstract harm and tangible gains” to the university. Lastly, employee self-interest and job survival.  Joe Paterno was the head football coach at Penn State for almost half of a century. Before the scandal broke he had no intentions of retiring, shortly after the scandal broke he intended to retire and shortly after that he was fired. It is debatable what he was fired for but it is obvious that he felt that his job was in jeopardy. He also feared the sanctions that could have been put on Penn State by the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA). The NCAA could have suspended the football program, limited the number of scholarships for incoming football players or even vacated wins. All of these fears, when combined, make the decision of Joe Paterno to not want to go the police more understandable. Every section defined by Darley aligns with the case of Joe Paterno. So the question of how Joe Paterno was drawn into this situation has been answered. So what did Joe do after all of this was brought to his attention?

Even more convincing is what Joe Paterno said after the allegations of the mother of an assaulted boy were brought to the attention of the media. ‘“With the benefit of hindsight, I wish I had done more,’ Paterno said in regard to fulfilling his legal obligation, but not his moral one…” (Thamel). This has a striking similarity to what Darley says happens to individuals who are corrupted by a corporation. “...the person faces not the prospective choice to do harm but the retrospective choice to acknowledge that his or her actions have already done harm. The more it becomes clear that those harms should have been foreseen, the more guilt, shame and blame are acquired in the acknowledgment of past harms. But often failing to acknowledge past harms means continuing to commit harms in the present” (Darley, p. 28). Paterno’s guilt, shame and blame inhibit clarity. Paterno’s actions align perfectly with what Darley presents in his argument. Summing up the argument so far yields the following: Paterno was blinded by the corporate structure around him, and although was blinded, according to Darley, completely responsible that his actions did not lead to the arrest of Jerry Sandusky in 2002. There are two sides to the argument of Paterno’s actions. I have taken the side of inadequate action while the opposition says that he did what his job required of him.